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Abstract 
 
Today, the threats to information security and assurance are great. While there are many avenues 
for IT professionals to safeguard against these threats, many times these defenses prove useless 
against typical system users. Mandated by laws and regulations, all government agencies and 
most private companies have established information assurance (IA) awareness programs, most 
of which include user training. Much has been given in the existing literature to laying out the 
guidance for the roles and responsibilities of IT professionals and higher level managers, but less 
is specified for "everyday" users of information systems. This thesis attempts to determine the 
content necessary to educate system users of their roles and responsibilities for IA. Using the 
NIST Special Publication 800-50 as a guide, categories of threats and knowledge areas are 
established and the literature is analyzed to verify these categories. The thesis closes with a 
comparison of the IA awareness training modules of the United States Air Force and Defense 
Information Systems Agency and a discussion of areas of further research concerning IA 
awareness training. 
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Introduction 
 
Within the past several years, there have been many high profile examples of 
governmental and corporate data loss. The Department of Veterans Affairs made 
headlines when, in May 2006, an analyst’s home was broken into and an agency laptop, 
containing information (including social security numbers) on over 26 million veterans, 
was stolen (The Associated Press, 2006). The analyst responsible was in violation of 
agency policy. In January 2007, retail giant TJX Companies, parent company of TJ 
Maxx, Marshalls and other retail stores, admitted to having lost customer information to 
hackers. The company estimates 94 million (more than double the original figures of 45 
million) credit and debit card numbers were taken from a company system by an 
unknown number of intruders (Vijayan, 2007). The company’s wireless systems were left 
unsecure and the thefts went unnoticed for over 18 months (Vijayan, 2007). 
Other retailers have felt the sting of indirect data breaches as well. In October of 
2007, a backup computer tape was discovered missing from a warehouse run by Iron 
Mountain Inc, the backup storage provider to GE Money. GE Money handles credit card 
operations for J.C. Penney and many other retail stores. Information on the backup tape 
includes personal information for about 650,000 customers and Social Security numbers 
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for about 150,000 customers (The Associated Press, 2008). The backup tape is still 
missing. 
Neither is the problem of data breaches confined to the United States. In England, 
two CDs, containing the entire database of child benefits, were lost in the mail. HM 
Revenue and Customs, the responsible office, reported information in the database 
included children’s names, addresses, birthdates and National Insurance ID numbers as 
well as bank account information of parents and guardians (McCue, 2007). While the 
discs were mailed out on October 18, 2007, it wasn’t reported internally until November 
8, 2007; the public wasn’t notified until November 20, 2007 (McCue, 2007). The bright 
spot in this story is the information on the discs was encrypted. 
Sometimes the attacks originate from within the organization, rather than outside. 
In 2007, Fidelity National Information Services suffered a data breach in the form of a 
“rouge and dishonest employee” stealing records (The Associated Press, 2007). Most of 
the records stolen included individuals’ bank account and personal information. The 
employee worked at a subsidiary, Certegy, and had stolen the information to sell to 
marketing companies through a self-owned company (The Associated Press, 2007). 
Attackers are refining their form of operations too. The US Federal Bureau of 
Investigations released a warning concerning e-mail based attacks with a Valentine’s Day 
theme (Keizer, 2008). In the past, attackers have utilized attachments, which, when 
opened by the user, pass along malicious code, such as Trojan horses or viruses. The 
newer method uses an IP-address-only link in the e-mail, in this case purporting to be a 
link to an e-card, leading to an infected computer on the botnet which then infects the 
target computer (Keizer, 2008). 
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With the frequency of attacks and data breaches, the actual financial cost is 
incredibly high to organizations. In 2006, companies responding to a survey from 
CSI/FBI reported an estimated $52.49M lost to information security incidents (Gordan, 
Loeb, Lucyshyn, & Richardson, 2006). The respondents represented all areas of industry, 
ranging from medical to government to retail to financial to information technology. 
These incidents included computer viruses, laptop theft, denial of service, system 
penetration, financial fraud, and unauthorized access to information other various 
methods of attack. Methods used to combat these cyber-security incidents include 
firewalls, anti-virus and anti-spyware software, intrusion detection systems, access 
control lists (server based), encryption of data in storage and transit, and other defensive 
technologies (Gordan et al., 2006). With the consequences of losing or mishandling data 
shown to be so great, what can be done to protect an organization’s data?  Firewalls, 
intrusion detection software, penetration testing, anti-virus/anti-spyware software, among 
other things, can all provide layers of defense against data loss and intrusion (Gordan et 
al., 2006). But these methods really only provide a partial defense against the hackers, 
spies, and social engineers; in other words, the outside attackers working to get inside an 
organization’s information systems. But that is only half the battle. Users represent a 
greater threat because of the trusted access given by the organization (Schou & 
Shoemaker, 2007). According to the CSI/FBI survey, over 65% of respondents 
contributed some organizational data loss to authorized users (Gordan et al., 2006). The 
survey also indicated respondents considered security awareness of employees to be very 
important to the overall security of the organization (Gordan et al., 2006).  
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Users make up the largest group within an organization and, as such, can be the 
difference between success and failure in an IT security program (Wilson, de Zafra, 
Pitcher, Tressler, & Ippolito, Information Technology Security Training Requirements: A 
Role- and Performance-Based Model - NIST SP 800-16, 1998). To combat this ever-
present problem, the organization must make users aware of the threats and 
vulnerabilities to maintaining information assurance and security. Beyond the basic need 
for IT security is government legislation, mandating organizations to establish IT security 
programs within certain guidelines (United States Congress, 2002). This legislation, in 
the form of either the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002 or 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, also requires organizations to inform users of their rights and 
responsibilities when using information systems (United States Congress, 2002). 
 
Research Question 
 
Using the NIST SP800-50 as a guide, this thesis will compare two IA awareness 
training modules. Both training modules are specific to the Department of Defense 
(DoD), as opposed to private organizations. The first, developed by the US Air Force 
(USAF), is a web-based training program, utilizing graphics, sound and user interaction. 
The second, developed by DISA, has actually been adopted by the DoD for 
implementation by all sub-agencies. The DISA training is also web-based and includes 
the use of graphics, sound and user-interactivity. The research question can be broken 
down into three parts: 
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RQ 1:  Does the AF IA awareness training module comprehensively cover the 
topic list put forth in the NIST SP 800-50? 
RQ 2:  Does the DISA IA awareness training module comprehensively cover the 
topic list put forth in the NIST SP 800-50? 
RQ 3:  Does one module incorporate more of the NIST topic list than the other 
module? 
 
Training Requirements 
  
Air Force Instructions (AFIs) concerning information assurance are governed by 
federal and Department of Defense (DoD) policies. These policies stem from the Federal 
Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002 and from DoD Directive 
8500.1, which required compliance with FISMA. DoD Directive 8500.1, Information 
Assurance, is instrumental in assuring that “all DoD information systems shall maintain 
and appropriate level of confidentiality, integrity, authentication, non-reputation, and 
availability that reflect a balance among the importance and sensitivity of the information 
and information assets” (DoD Directive 8500.1.)   DoD Directive 8570.1, Information 
Assurance Training, Certification, and Workforce Management, sets the stage for our 
network security directives by requiring every DoD member to complete Information 
Assurance training before they are allowed to access the network (DoD Directives 
8570.1.)   
The AF, utilizing the guidance and authority from the DoD directive, has adapted 
a series of Air Force Policy Directives (AFPD) and Air Force Instructions (AFI) to 
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encompass network security for AF networks and information systems. AFPD 33-2, 
“Information Assurance (IA) Program,” provides overarching scope and direction for all 
things related to information security within the AF. AFPD 33-2 also implements IA 
policy that is based “on fact-based operational risk assessments; total risk avoidance is 
not practical in many cases and, therefore, risk assessment and management is required” 
(AFPD 33-2, 2007, p. 3.)  This policy directive also clarifies the terms “information 
assurance” (as used in DoD and AF IA programs) and “information security” (per 
FISMA) as being synonymous in meaning. Specific instructions, roles, responsibilities 
and requirements for policy developers, commanders, information professionals and 
users are found in AFI 33-202, Volume 1, “Network and Computer Security.” 
Though the AF has policy in place to establish information assurance awareness 
training, much of it is vague and all-encompassing in scope. AFPD 33-2, Section 4.6 
discusses the education and training for IA professionals, indicating DoDD 8570.1, 
Information Assurance (IA) Training, Certification and Workforce Management, as the 
guide for IA programs. However, it is left to IA managers to develop programs to educate 
and make aware the users of policies and risks to the information systems, 
“commensurate with an individual’s respective responsibilities” (AFPD 33-2, 2007, p. 3.)  
The AF has implemented several iterations of information assurance awareness training 
required of the entire force. This training is required for initial access to AF network 
systems and then required annually (and in many cases, upon a permanent change of 
station) in order to maintain system access. 
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Information Assurance and Awareness Defined 
 
Information assurance is concerned with protecting information as well as 
ensuring the availability of the systems and information used for access when needed 
(Conklin, White, Cothren, Williams, & Davis, 2004). The Air Force definition of 
information assurance is the “measures that protect and defend information and 
information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, 
confidentiality, and non-repudiation.” (Air Force Information Protection Module, 
accessed Dec 2007)  Schou and Trimmer (2004) reiterate this idea, but they cite only 
confidentiality (which includes all aspects of information security), availability and 
integrity. However, they expand the proposal of protecting and defending information by 
categorizing the methods into three fundamental countermeasures:  technology, 
operations and awareness, training and education (Schou & Trimmer, 2004.)  For 
purposes of this paper, the focus will be on the final category. 
 In his book “Information Security:  Protecting the Global Enterprise,” Donald L. 
Pipkin (2000) devotes an entire chapter to awareness, discussing the importance of a user 
awareness program to overall system security. His perspective considers awareness in 
four parts: defining appropriate use, the makeup of the program, the design of the 
program and the implementation of the program (Pipkin, 2000.)  The program should be 
relevant to each user in their capacity as it is very important to convey the roles and 
responsibilities to the users of an information system in order to protect the rights of both 
the company and the individual. Pipkin (2000) cites an example of a user in England who 
was fired for using an organizational computer inappropriately, but was reinstated when 
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the courts ruled the user was not appropriately made aware of the policies and the 
consequences of violating the policies. 
 The awareness program should be the first step for a user obtaining access to the 
organization’s information systems and should be a continuous requirement as long as the 
user requires access. The program should not only pertain to the technological aspects of 
the environment, but should also focus on all aspects of information assurance. The 
program should communicate the importance of information security in a way that is 
readily understood by all users and should do so in a manner cost effective to the 
organization (Pipkin, 2000.) 
 Designing the program, Pipken (2000) says, should focus on the delivery 
methods, actual content of the message and the timeliness of the information within the 
training. Implementation is the final step for an awareness program. There are several 
options to implement the program, which could vary by organization. Keeping cost in 
mind, awareness can be executed across the entire user community, focused on smaller 
user groups or even by the individual (Pipken, 2000.)  But beyond the value added of 
informing users of the importance of information security and appropriate system use, the 
Air Force has the force of law behind assurance awareness training.  
 
Thesis Layout 
 
 Chapter 1 has introduced the topic and research questions. It also provided the 
background and definitions to be discussed within the thesis. Chapter 2 will provide an 
examination and discussion of the literature and lay the basis for the content analysis. 
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Definitions of information assurance, awareness, training and other key terms will be 
taken from the existing literature. This thesis will also explore the differences in training 
levels required for different user types, i.e. end-users, senior management, IT 
professionals. The threats to information assurance and security will also be examined as 
this presents some of the framework for required content in training programs. Though 
the focus of this thesis is on specific computer-based training programs, other methods of 
delivering IA training will be discussed, mostly to add to the content base to educate 
users, but also to discuss different ideas concerning IA programs. 
The comparison of the two training modules will follow a modified content 
analysis research methodology, which will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 4 will review the results of the research, discussing the findings and the 
limitations of the methodology used in this thesis. Chapter 5 will offer conclusions based 
on the research and recommend areas of further research concerning the topic of 
information assurance awareness. 
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Literature Review 
 
In 2002, the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) was passed 
and dictated how information technology was to be viewed, used and managed within the 
federal government. FISMA tasked the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) with establishing the standards organizations should use to fulfill FISMA 
requirements. Therefore, this research will review FISMA and NIST documents and 
requirements for information assurance training. In order to establish the authority and 
influence of the NIST standards, this thesis will provide examples from the literature 
applying these same ideas and, in some cases, specifically referencing NIST documents. 
 
Federal Information Security Management Act 
 
 According to NIST SP 800-39, the E-Government Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-
347) recognizes “the importance of information security to the economic and national 
security interests of the United States” (Ross, Katzke, Johnson, Swanson, & Stoneburner, 
2007, p. 2). Title III of this act is what is commonly referred to as “FISMA”, the Federal 
Information Security Management Act. In FISMA, Congress stated that all national 
agencies would implement and report on information security programs. It is further 
stated an effective program would include, among other facets of information security, 
“…(4) security awareness training to inform personnel, including contractors and other 
users of information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency, of— 
(A) information security risks associated with their activities; and (B) their 
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responsibilities in complying with agency policies and procedures designed to reduce 
these risks;” (United States Congress, 2002, p. 53). FISMA can be viewed as an 
extension of the Computer Security Act of 1987, which was similar in scope and intent 
and required the recurring training in computer security awareness for “…all employees 
who are involved with the management, use, or operation of each Federal computer 
system…” (United States Congress, 1987, p. 3). The Computer Security Act of 1987 also 
established the authority of the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) in matters 
concerning standards and guidelines for computer systems in federal agencies. The next 
year, with PL 100-418, Congress changed the name of the NBS to the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology (United States Congress, 1988). 
 
National Institute of Standards and Technology 
 
 It is through FISMA that the NIST is tasked with the general mission of 
developing “…standards and guidelines, including minimum requirements, for 
information systems used or operated by an agency or by a contractor of an agency or 
other organization on behalf of an agency…” (United States Congress, 2002, p. 59). 
Given this mission, the NIST has published many documents concerning information 
security, including Special Publication (SP) 800-53, Recommended Security Controls for 
Federal Information Systems; SP 800-39, Managing Risk from Information Systems: An 
Organizational Perspective (Draft); SP 800-12, An Introduction to Computer Security: 
The NIST Handbook; SP 800-16, Information Technology Security Training 
Requirements: A Role- and Performance-Based Model; and, SP 800-50, Building an 
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Information Technology Security Awareness and Training Program. Each of these 
publications discusses the importance of raising user awareness in regards to system 
security and information assurance. NIST SP 800-50 is of particular interest to this thesis 
because it provides an authoritative list of topics and concerns relating to information 
assurance awareness training. It also establishes the difference between awareness, 
training, and education, as defined in NIST SP 800-16. 
According to NIST SP 800-50, an organization should focus security awareness 
and training for all information system users. The purpose of this is two-fold: one, it 
provides the method of communicating security requirements and news across the 
organization; two, it describes the rules and regulations for using the IT systems and 
information (Wilson & Hash, 2003). It is important to distinguish between awareness, 
training, and education (See Figure 1) because each contributes differently to the security 
learning continuum (Wilson & Hash, 2003). NIST 800-16 defines the three terms as: 
Awareness:  “Awareness is not training. The purpose of awareness presentations 
is simply to focus attention on security.” (Wilson, de Zafra, Pitcher, Tressler, & 
Ippolito, 1998, p. 15) 
Training:  “The “Training” level of the learning continuum strives to produce 
relevant and needed security skills and competency by practitioners of functional 
specialties other than IT security (e.g., management, systems design and 
development, acquisition, auditing).” (Wilson et al., 1998, p. 16) 
Education:  “The “Education” level integrates all of the security skills and 
competencies of the various functional specialties into a common body of 
knowledge, adds a multi-disciplinary study of concepts, issues, and principles 
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(technological and social), and strives to produce IT security specialists and 
professionals capable of vision and pro-active response” (Wilson et al., 1998, p. 
16). 
 
 
Figure 1 ‐ The IT Security Learning Continuum (Wilson & Hash, 2003) 
 
 
Awareness “campaigns” are used to simply establish user recognition of 
information security. Whether in the form of posters, computer log-on notices or weekly 
security e-mails, the goal is to reinforce a behavior in the users (Wilson, de Zafra, 
Pitcher, Tressler, & Ippolito, 1998). The user is simply a recipient of information. 
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Training, on the other hand, has the goal of “building knowledge and skills to facilitate 
the job performance” or specific skill(s) users should be able to apply (Wilson & Hash, 
2003). As shown in the continuum model, NIST SP 800-16 recommends “a bridge or 
transitional stage between awareness and training…” (Wilson & Hash, 2003)  This bridge 
is the security basics and literacy material, consisting of “a core set of terms, topics, and 
concepts” (Wilson & Hash, 2003).  
To establish a security awareness and training program, a plan must identify the 
material to be covered. The list identified for each organization will provide the 
foundation for the entire security program (Wilson & Hash, 2003). However, not all 
organizations will necessarily require the same topics for security awareness and training; 
though many will be similar to all programs, the topics should be tailored to an 
organization’s policies, requirements and goals (Wilson & Hash, 2003). To aid in this, 
NIST 800-50 has provided a list of awareness topics that can be used (See Table 1). While 
an awareness program can consist of simple posters or e-mail messages, it is consistent 
with the literacy level of the learning continuum model, to incorporate more information 
on each topic (Wilson & Hash, 2003). 
  
14 
 
 
Table 1 ‐ Awareness Topics (Wilson & Hash, 2003) 
Password usage and management  
Protection from malicious code  
Policy – implications of noncompliance 
Unknown e-mail/attachments 
Web usage and monitoring of user activity 
Spam 
Data backup and storage  
Social engineering  
Supported/allowed software on organization systems 
Access control issues  
Individual accountability  
Use of acknowledgement statements  
Visitor control and physical access to spaces  
Desktop security 
Incident response  
Shoulder surfing 
Changes in system environment  
Inventory and property transfer  
Personal use and gain issues 
Handheld device security issues  
Use of encryption  
Laptop security  
Personally owned systems/software at work  
Configuration management 
Software license restriction issues 
Protect information subject to confidentiality 
concerns  
E-mail list etiquette 
 
 
Current IA Awareness Literature 
 
 
 In order to demonstrate the comprehensiveness of the awareness topics developed 
by NIST, the rest of this chapter will review books, articles, conference papers, and 
commercial white papers. This review will discuss the correlations between the academic 
and corporate literature and government publications in regards to information awareness 
training. This will provide the basis for using the NIST awareness topics as the tool for 
analyzing the Air Force and DISA IA training modules. 
 In the article, Users Are Not the Enemy (1999), Adams and Sass report on a 
comparative study conducted with two companies, one in the technology sector and the 
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other in construction. Concentrating on the confidentiality aspect of the security triad, the 
study focused on password issues, especially user behavior and password memorability. 
The study found “four major factors influencing effective password usage” (Adams & 
Sasse, 1999). These factors were related to multiple passwords, password content, 
perceived compatibility with work practices, and user perceptions of organizational 
security and information sensitivity (Adams & Sasse, 1999). 
The problem associated with multiple passwords was the difficulty users had in 
remembering several different passwords without circumventing security policy, such as 
writing passwords down. Password content was a problem because of poor user 
knowledge of content requirements for passwords. The study also showed that some 
users would bypass security policies out of a perceived incompatibility with work 
practices, specifically dealing with groups and group passwords. Another reason the 
study gave for poor password usage among users was a lack of user knowledge of real 
security risks and threats. Adams and Sasse (1999) blamed this on “the authoritarian 
approach” that led to unwillingness on the part of security departments to share threat and 
risk information with users. Also, the security departments poorly educated users of 
security classification information, causing a disparity in how users treated sensitive 
information. 
 Adams and Sasse saw two problems for effective password usage among users:  
system and external factors. System factors are policies or requirements users feel the 
need to circumvent. External factors are centered on compatibility (or incompatibility) 
with working procedures. Both factors stem from a lack of communication between users 
and security. The authors make four recommendations, with all but one (the second) 
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consistent with the awareness topics in NIST 800-50: 1) Provide users better 
instruction/training for password content; 2) Reduce the need for multiple passwords or 
move to single sign-on for multiple systems; 3) Increase user visibility of system security 
and existing/potential threats; and 4) Provide system/information sensitivity 
(classification) guidance to users.  
 In the article “Security awareness: Switch to a better programme,” Everett C. 
Johnson, the immediate past international president of ISACA, discusses the need to 
inform users and develop and maintain a good security program (Johnson, 2006). 
(ISACA is an international organization focused on IT governance. It was formerly the 
Information Systems Audit and Control Association, but now is known solely by its 
acronym. (ISACA, 2008))  Though a defense for IT security expenditures, especially 
training for IT professionals, Johnson presents reasons for maintaining an IT security 
plan similar to those provided in NIST publications. Johnson (2006) asserts a good 
security program begins by changing the organization’s mindset. With more than 30% of 
IT security related incidents beginning from the inside of organizations, there is a definite 
need to make all users aware of good security practices (Johnson, 2006). The article also 
proposes a list of awareness topics common to any organization. This includes the 
security policy, major risks to info security, countermeasures, security incident reporting, 
and the basics of the security organization, such as functions, departments, and 
responsibilities (Johnson, 2006). The author also recommends including topics 
concerning physical access, classification guidance, viruses/Trojans, backup procedures, 
and proper use of equipment, Internet, and e-mail (Johnson, 2006). This list includes 
roughly half of the topics recommended in NIST 800-50. 
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 Ives, Walsh, & Schneider (2004) also discuss password usage and management. 
In their article, “The Domino Effect of Password Reuse”, they note the problem with 
users reusing passwords on multiple systems is that all systems are now as unsecure as 
the least secure (Ives, Walsh, & Schneider, 2004). The article provides the following 
example:  if a hacker captures passwords from a poorly secured system within an 
organization, there is a definite threat to the breached system. But if users have reused the 
same passwords for access to other, more secure systems, those systems are now exposed 
to the same threat (Ives, Walsh, & Schneider, 2004). The authors propose IT security 
should move away from passwords to Public Key Infrastructure/Encryption (PKI/PKE) in 
order to abate this potential risk to information assurance (Ives, Walsh, & Schneider, 
2004). Ives et al. (2004) also recommend security training for users should be improved 
and even include technologies such as biometrics, smart cards, PKI, and PKE. 
 In the editorial preface to the initial edition of the Journal of Organizational and 
End User Computing on Informational Security, Schou and Trimmer discuss the 
importance of IA awareness training in the overall scheme of information security (Schou 
& Trimmer, 2005). They depict IA as being a triad of means, projecting a defense in 
depth, with technology and policy making up the top two levels. The third level, largest 
and most important, is the people within the organization, the users of the information 
(Schou & Trimmer, 2005). Though the editorial does not specify topics to include in IA 
awareness training, Schou & Trimmer (2005) cite NIST and the Committee on National 
Security Standards (CNSS) as the main standards for developing awareness, training, and 
education programs. 
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In a paper presented to conference proceedings for the Journal of Information 
System Security, the authors proposed ten domains for IA awareness training. The topics 
they recommended to emphasize in training are passwords, social engineering, e-mail, 
physical security, proper computer security (locking/logging off), internet usage, phishing 
and handling storage media and portable computers (Mellor & Noyes, 2005). Using NIST 
SP 800-16 as a guide, Mellor and Noyes (2005) created an IA awareness training model 
which utilizes a checklist to incorporate personal accountability in the training. The 
importance of this, according to the authors, is “it literally transforms the trainee from a 
passive learner to an active learner as they become individually accountable for the 
material presented.” (Mellor & Noyes, 2005)  Each of the ten domains is a NIST 
recommended topic for awareness training and individual accountability, also an 
awareness matter, is applied in a distinct style. 
There are also many organizations implementing IA awareness programs based 
partly or wholly on the standards laid out in NIST SP 800-50. The Department of Veteran 
Affairs covers the following topics in its VA Cyber Security Awareness Course: 
identification of information security officer, passwords, privacy and confidentiality, 
backups (data), viruses, incidents, infrastructure protection, social engineering, and 
authorized use of information systems (U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs). Each of 
these is included in the recommended awareness topics in NIST 800-50. 
The state of Nebraska has published guides also using principles from NIST 
publications. Formed under the state’s Chief Information Officer’s office, the Nebraska 
Information Technology Commission (NITC) offers a handbook for information security 
officers as well as templates for writing an organization’s security policy, to include an 
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awareness program for employees (NITC, 2001). This guide stresses the importance of 
establishing security rules for system usage and recommends the following categories to 
be covered:  access control; network security; e-mail, internet and e-commerce; 
workstation/office; physical/people security; copyright; acceptable use. The document 
also covers incident reporting, risks and threats, such as hackers, viruses, and social 
engineering (NITC, 2001). 
To conclude, information assurance awareness training is vital to successfully 
defending an organization’s information system. While there is much written about the 
issue of educating users, there is little in the way of a definitive catalog of essential 
awareness topics. The literature and current training programs seem to point to the same 
general themes important to user awareness. As discussed earlier in this chapter, these 
themes are neatly captured in NIST 800-50. This provides the basis for comparing the AF 
and DISA training modules as it is currently the most comprehensive and authoritative 
guidance on raising user awareness. 
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Methodology 
 
Introduction 
 
 The purpose of this research was to determine the comprehensiveness of two 
information assurance awareness training modules. To do this, an initial baseline had to 
be determined. The literature review in Chapter Two established the baseline as the 
awareness topics laid out in NIST SP800-50. To compare the baseline and the training 
modules, a content analysis methodology was used. What follows in this chapter is an 
explanation of how this methodology was applied to the data. The chapter concludes with 
a review of the advantages and limitations of conducting content analysis research. 
 
Content Analysis 
 
 As a methodology, there are several definitions of content analysis. Krippendorf 
defines it as “a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from data to 
their context” (Krippendorf, 1980, p. 21). He describes it as a tool one can use to provide 
new knowledge, insights and representation of “facts” (Krippendorf, 1980). Neuendorf, 
on the other hand, says content analysis is “a summarizing, quantitative analysis of 
messages that relies on the scientific method…and is not limited to the types of variable 
that may be measured or the context in which the messages are created or presented” 
(Neuendorf, 2002, p. 10). 
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 Carley, in her 1993 article, states simply, “content analysis focuses on the 
frequency with which words or concepts occur in texts or across texts” (Carley, 1993, p. 
81). The purpose is to take a list of concepts and analyze a set of texts for the number of 
times each concept occurs within the texts, the intent being to gain some insight and 
understanding into the texts (Carley, 1993). 
 There are also two types of content analysis a researcher can use, conceptual and 
relational. Relational content analysis focuses on the relations between concepts in the 
text. In this type of study, the researcher takes the view that individual concepts have no 
meaning without the semantic, or meaningful, relationships to other concepts (Busch, et 
al., 2005). Conceptual analysis is more traditional and uses established concepts and 
analyzes the texts for quantifying/tallying the presence of the chosen concepts (Busch, et 
al., 2005). 
 This study is not concerned with concept relations, but rather the tallying of 
concepts within the texts. As such, this research followed the steps of content analysis 
laid out by Carley (1993) and Busch et al. (2005). In the following paragraphs, these 
steps are outlined and include the specific actions taken for this study. 
1. Decide level of analysis. Are single words or phrases/word groups being 
coded? 
 For this analysis, both single words and phrases are used. This is because the 
study is based upon a specific list of awareness topics and the concepts are established.  
2. Decide what to do with “irrelevant” information. Should it be ignored or re-
examined and used to possibly change the coding scheme? 
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 Carley (1993) states it is the researcher’s decision as to what to do with irrelevant 
information. In this study, the definition for irrelevant information is any information not 
explicating pertaining to the topic at hand, i.e. information assurance awareness. Because 
this is a relatively narrow topic and the concepts are well-defined, there was little 
expectation on the part of the researcher to encounter similar topics not already included 
in the study. Therefore, irrelevant information was disregarded for the purposes of this 
thesis. 
There are two types of irrelevant information, meaningless and meaningful. 
Meaningless information can be considered to be common words, such as “the”, “and”, 
“to”, “of”, “be”, etc. These words are common to most, if not all, texts and, as such, do 
not add to the analysis of the concepts. Meaningful information is considered to be 
concepts, either similar to those under examination, or important in its own right. For 
example, “constitution” is a concept with great meaning, but because that meaning is not 
directly applicable to this study, it would be considered irrelevant information and 
ignored.  
3. Decide how many concepts to code for. This step is also concerned with 
whether the concepts will be pre-defined or interactive. Pre-defined concepts are 
established from a specific, rigid set of categories. Interactive concepts allow flexibility 
in adding new categories as the coding progresses. 
 This study will code for a pre-defined set of concepts. These concepts have been 
established by NIST SP 800-50, as discussed in Chapter Two. Please see the codebook 
(appendix something) for the specific definitions and exceptions for coding each concept. 
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4. Decide how to distinguish between concepts, i.e. the level of generalization. 
Will similar terms be coded the same or will the terms warrant separate coding? 
Busch et al. (2005) gave the example of “expensive” and “expensiveness”. Do the 
words mean the same or are the meanings different enough to be considered different 
terms?  Because this study is utilizing a pre-existing set of concepts, the level of 
generalization is accepted as established in NIST SP 800-50. Instances in which 
compromises of the topic list can be made are discussed in the next step, rules for coding. 
5. Develop rules for coding the selected texts. 
These are the translation rules. These rules explain the decisions in step 4 so data 
is coded the same throughout study. This also provides the groundwork for replication of 
the study. The translation rules are contained in the codebook, found in Appendix A. 
6. Decide whether to code for existence or frequency of each concept. Existence 
relates to whether or not the word/phrase appears in the text. Frequency, on the other 
hand, is derived from how often the word/phrase appears. 
 It was decided to use a combination method of existence and frequency when 
coding the two training modules. As each slide was examined, the existence of a concept 
would warrant a tally. The concept was tallied only once per slide, even if the concept 
appeared multiple times on the slide. But, if the concept appeared on more than one slide, 
it was tallied for each slide it appeared on. This thesis placed an exception upon tallying 
the frequency of concepts. As an awareness and training tool for personnel, the modules 
being examined may have slides which list several different concepts, but have no 
definitions or explanations of the concepts. Because this analysis is attempting to 
measure the comprehensiveness of the training modules, a simple mentioning of a 
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concept would not raise either security awareness or user training. For example, if a slide 
were to contain the word “virus” with no explanation, a user could misinterpret this as a 
physical human virus that causes illness, not as a computer virus that presents harm to 
information assurance on information systems. In such an instance, user awareness is not 
raised as intended and the training has failed at that particular occurrence of the concept. 
Also, each module contains summary and question slides which were not tallied for this 
analysis as the information on these slides was previously counted. 
7. Code the texts. 
 The texts were two information assurance awareness training modules, one 
created by the USAF, the other by DISA. Both are geared toward DoD usage, to include 
military, civilians, and contractors who use DoD information systems. Both modules are 
administered in the form of computer based training and are viewed similar to 
PowerPoint presentations. 
8. Analyze the results. 
After coding of the texts is complete, the researcher will examine the data, 
making observations, in order to formulate conclusions and generalizations based on the 
content analysis. The results will be provided in Chapter Four and the analysis and 
conclusions will be discussed in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
 
Summary 
 
 
Content analysis has been shown to be an effective methodology for analyzing 
textual content and context (Carley, 1993; Busch et al., 2005; Neuendorf, 2002; 
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Krippendorf, 1980). Carley (1993) and Busch et al. (2005) provide a content analysis 
framework that fits this type of study very well. The steps taken for this study and 
outlined in this chapter provide the basis for future research on this topic. The next 
chapter will discuss the results of the content analysis. 
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Analysis of Results 
 
Introduction 
 
 This chapter discusses the findings of the content analysis of the two IA 
awareness training modules. To provide for a better understanding of the results, a basic 
description of each module will be offered. Following the background, the results will be 
provided, as well as identifying some of the more significant findings. 
 
Background 
 
 Both the USAF and DISA training modules are completed by users online. The 
DISA module is accessible by the general public at http://iase.disa.mil/eta/. The USAF 
module is accessible only to authorized users of AF systems who have a valid user logon 
for the Advanced Distributed Learning Service 
(https://golearn.csd.disa.mil/kc/login/login.asp) system. In order to facilitate future 
research, the USAF module used in this study has been replicated through the use of 
screen captures and can be found in Appendix B. 
 The AF module utilizes roll-overs, using the mouse and cursor to bring up more 
information on a topic. The DISA training is similar, but requires a mouse-click to 
display the added content. The DISA module makes use of audio, using a narrator to 
convey the training, and visual, employing transitions of information on single slides. 
The AF training is static, other than the aforementioned roll-over use, and provided links 
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to extra material, typically policy guidance or regulations (See Figure 2). The DISA 
training offers similar links and roll-overs for extra materials (See Figure 3).  
 
Figure 2 - USAF Module - Example of Link Slide 
 
 
Figure 3 - DISA Training - Example of Roll-overs 
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The entire AF module contains 47 slides, but, as explained in Chapter 3, this 
study examined only 27. The DISA training has 75 slides, nearly three times as many. 
Both modules insert test-like questions after each section of training. All questions relate 
to material previously covered and require a response from the user. However, neither 
module scores the user or employs a grading scale for wrong answers. Regardless of a 
user’s performance on the questions, a certificate of completion is given at the end of the 
training, the only requirement having been to view each slide of the presentation. 
 
Results 
 
 In this study, there were a few ways to display the results. The DISA training 
covered 93% of the NIST recommended topics, while the USAF training covered 56% of 
the topics (See Table 2). 
Table 2 - Topic Coverage 
 Concept USAF DISA 
Topics covered 15 25 
Topics not 
covered 12 2 
 
 Though the number of topics covered throughout the training provides some 
insight, the actual frequency of each topic within the training gives the study more 
information (See Table 3). There are several topics which the DISA training seems to 
have covered more in depth than the USAF training. Some of these are malicious code, 
unknown e-mail attachments, web usage and monitoring of user activity, individual 
accountability, and laptop security. These results are noteworthy because of the disparity 
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of training coverage, with the DISA training spending a minimum of four more slides 
than the USAF training. 
Table 3 - Concept Occurrence Results 
Concept USAF DISA 
Password usage and management 1  1 
Malicious code, protection from 1  7 
Policy – implications of noncompliance 2  5 
Unknown e-mail/attachments 0  4 
Web usage and monitoring of user activity 1  5 
Spam 0  0 
Data backup/storage 1  2 
Social engineering 1  3 
Software, supported/allowed on organization 
systems 1  1 
Access control issues 2  4 
Individual accountability 1  5 
Use of acknowledgement statements 0  2 
Visitor control/physical access to spaces 0  2 
Desktop security 1  1 
Incident response 3  6 
Shoulder surfing 0  0 
Changes in system environment 1  1 
Inventory and property transfer 0  1 
Personal use/gain issues 1  2 
Handheld device, security issues 0  2 
Use of encryption 1  3 
Laptop security 0  5 
Personally owned systems/software at work 0  1 
Configuration management 0  1 
Software license restriction issues 0  1 
Protecting information, confidentiality concerns 4  6 
E-mail list etiquette 0  3 
 
 Despite the difference in the number of occurrences of some concepts, there were 
several concepts both modules covered equally or nearly equally. These include password 
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usage/management, data backup/storage, software (supported/allowed on organization 
systems), changes in system environment, personal use/gain issues (See Table 4). Each of 
these concepts was covered in one or two slides in both the USAF and DISA modules. 
Two concepts, spam and shoulder surfing, were not covered at all by either training 
module (See Table 5). 
Table 4 ‐ Similar Concept Occurrence 
Concept USAF DISA 
Password usage and management 1  1 
Data backup/storage 1  2 
Software, supported/allowed on organization systems 1  1 
Desktop security 1  1 
Changes in system environment 1  1 
Personal use/gain issues 1  2 
 
Table 5 ‐ Zero Concept Occurrences 
Concept USAF DISA 
Spam 0 0
Shoulder surfing 0 0
 
 
Summary 
 
 The results of analyzing the content of the two training modules reveal differences 
in the amount of topic coverage. The DISA training covered more topics from the NIST 
awareness topic list than did the USAF training module. The DISA module also had more 
slides discussing each concept. The next chapter will, based on these results, offer some 
conclusions and recommendations for IA awareness training and future research in the 
topic area. 
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Conclusion 
 
Introduction 
  
The purpose of this research, as established in the first chapter, was to answer 
three research questions. Based on the analysis written in Chapter 4, this final chapter 
will answer these questions. These questions were: 
RQ 1:  Does the USAF IA awareness training module comprehensively cover the 
topic list put forth in the NIST SP 800-50? 
RQ 2:  Does the DISA IA awareness training module comprehensively cover the 
topic list put forth in the NIST SP 800-50? 
RQ 3:  Does one module incorporate more of the NIST topic list than the other 
module? 
 
Discussion 
 
  The answer to RQ 1 is, simply, no. The USAF training module included just over 
half of the topics recommended in NIST SP800-50. Neither did the training spend much 
time, as measured in the number of slides given to each concept, on any but one concept 
(protecting information/confidentiality concerns). It should be taken into account this list 
is a suggested list (Wilson & Hash, 2003) and not a strict requirement for inclusion in all 
training programs. Though each topic has importance and value for information 
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assurance awareness among users, the length of the training must also be taken into 
account. 
 The answer to RQ2 is yes, in the opinion of this researcher, the DISA IA 
awareness training comprehensively covered the NIST topics. Because the DISA module 
contained more slides covering most of the concepts and included all but two of the 
topics, the training is more inclusive, based upon the NIST recommended topics, for 
raising user information security awareness levels.  
 In answer to the last research question, yes, one training module incorporated 
more of the NIST topic list than the other. As noted above, the DISA module covered 
more of the topics and with more depth than did the USAF module. This research 
concludes the USAF training should incorporate more of the concepts recommended in 
NIST SP800-50 in order to provide a more robust and in depth IA awareness training 
module for its users. Being a DoD component agency, the USAF could also simply 
implement the DISA training. 
 It should be noted that as recently as 2007, the USAF used an IA awareness 
training program that was more robust and intensive than the current iteration. This study 
did not compare the current and past training modules or attempt to ascertain why the 
changes were affected. Nevertheless, with the myriad of training required of USAF 
personnel, it is quite possible several of the IA awareness topics omitted in the researched 
training module are included in other required training. 
 A last observation and recommendation is that of both modules’ use of 
interactivity with the user.  Both modules satisfy federal requirements of annual user IA 
awareness training and users receive a certificate upon completion of the training 
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attesting to this.  Both modules also “quiz” users sporadically throughout the training 
session. However, neither module requires users to answer the questions correctly in 
order to “pass” the training. This research recommends some form of user accountability, 
beyond the simple “clicking-through” of training slides, to ensure better awareness 
among users.  
 
Limitations 
 
 The content analysis portion of this study was based upon the special publications 
of the NIST, specifically SP 800-50 and SP800-16. Both of these documents provided the 
basis for the concepts used in the analysis of the two training modules. However, there 
was still room for researcher bias. As a researcher, personal knowledge and opinions of 
the studied topic can introduce bias into the  research process and the analysis of the 
results (Mehra, 2002). To mitigate researcher bias in this study, the definitions developed 
for the various concepts were mostly taken from the glossary used in NIST publications, 
found in SP 800-16, Appendix C. Even though steps were taken to lessen the researcher 
bias in this study, it is inevitable some bias still exists. What is important in qualitative 
research is to recognize the presence of bias and the implications that stem from the bias 
(Mehra, 2002). 
Coder bias is another area of bias in this study. When coding, it is left to the coder 
to interpret the concepts and the text. Though rules and instructions are provided, there is 
still room for differences of interpretation to arise. Also, there was only one coder (the 
primary researcher) of the content. This further exacerbates the possibility of coder bias. 
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To mitigate this form of bias, multiple coders should have been used, each receiving a 
portion of the texts to code. This would have established better validity of the study. 
 Another limitation of this research is the number of training programs analyzed. 
Though there is no hard and fast requirement for the number of texts used in content 
analysis, it is normally accepted to use greater than 20 texts (Carley, 1993; Krippendorf, 
1980; Neuendorf, 2002). This research confined itself to the two selected training 
programs because of the significant similarities between user populations and policy. 
Additional  texts (i.e. IA awareness training programs) would have provided a larger 
basis for comparison, both of the concepts covered and the organization’s perceived 
value of those concepts. 
 
Areas of future research 
 
 This study focused on the inclusion of specific content in two training programs. 
There are several areas stemming from this thesis to be explored in future research. The 
first is the possibility of utilizing a similar content analysis of other training programs, 
seeking similar results. This type of study could validate or refute the findings of this 
study. Considering the changing nature to information systems and assurance, new 
security threats emerge on a regular basis. A future study of this type may uncover some 
of the new concepts that will play a vital part in raising user IA awareness.  
 Another area of future research is to measure the effectiveness of the different IA 
training modules. Though this study made no claims as to the value added by either 
module examined, an experiment using pre-test and post-test methods could make 
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reasonable conclusions as to training effectiveness. This could explore the idea more 
content equals better training. 
 Finally, further research should be undertaken into the different types of IA 
awareness training in different agencies. Whether as comparative case studies or content 
analysis research, future studies exploring the concepts discussed in multiple training 
programs would be useful in providing a complete taxonomy of IA awareness topics. 
This research used the NIST publications as the standard of measure for the training 
modules, but there are several standards of information management being used around 
the world today. COBIT (Control Objectives for Information and related Technology, 
created by the Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA) and the IT 
Governance Institute (ITGI)), ISO/IEC 27002 (published by the International 
Organization for Standardization and International Electrotechnical Commission), ITIL 
(Information Technology Infrastructure Library) also provide frameworks and 
recommendations for IA awareness programs and training. Organizations implementing 
training programs under these standards may discuss concepts not examined in the NIST 
or this study. By expanding the accepted concepts for IA training, organizations can 
extend the scope of users IA awareness. 
 
Summary 
 
 In summary, this thesis looked at two information assurance awareness training 
modules, used by DoD agencies. Using a topic list published by the NIST and employing 
a content analysis of both modules, the study was able to reach certain conclusions about 
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the comprehensiveness of the content in each module. It is the hope of this researcher that 
this study and the conclusions drawn from it will help in the creation of more 
comprehensive IA awareness user training in the future. 
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Appendix A. Codebook 
 
 This codebook is intended to provide coders all necessary instructions required to 
code information assurance awareness training modules. It is divided into three sections 
to aid in readability and understanding. Section 1 is coding instructions and includes a 
brief description of the modules to be coded. Section 2 is a glossary of the concepts 
(terms) the coder is analyzing. This can be used as the coder examines the texts as an aid 
for defining concepts. Section 3 is a sample code sheet. 
 
Section 1 – Coding Instructions 
 
 
 
The texts were two information assurance awareness training modules, one 
created by the United States Air Force (USAF), the other by Defense Information 
Systems Agency (DISA). Both are geared toward DoD usage, to include military, 
civilians, and contractors who use DoD information systems. Both modules are 
administered through web-based training and are to some extent comparable to 
PowerPoint presentations. Because of the similarity to PowerPoint presentations, further 
reference to the viewable screen within the modules will use the term “slide”. 
The text of the USAF module is provided because the module requires a system 
log-in, available only to users (military, civilian, and contractor) of USAF information 
systems. Screen captures of the training module is provided, however, this did not always 
provide all the information contained on each slide. For this reason, some slides are 
duplicated, in order to capture all data. The USAF module is found in Appendix B. It 
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should also be noted here that this study only looks at a portion of the USAF module. 
This is because the entire module contains topics other than information assurance and 
security. The slides not used in this study cover records management, Privacy Act, and 
Freedom of Information Act. Also not included in the appendix are the question and 
answer slides, as these are not to be coded. 
As the coder proceeds through the text, count each concept as it appears on each 
slide. The exception to this method is if the concept appears in a list and is not defined or 
explained on that slide (See Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4 ‐ USAF Module ‐ Slide 17 
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Section 2 – Glossary 
 
 
 
Password usage and management: A password is a protected/private alphanumeric 
string used to authenticate an identity or to authorize access to data. Usage and 
management is concerned with how and when users are expected to maintain and protect 
passwords. 
 
Malicious code, protection from: Malicious code is software or firmware capable of 
performing an unauthorized function on an IS. Viruses, Trojan horses, worms, etc. are 
included in this concept. Protection topics include scanning IT systems and updating 
virus definitions for anti-virus software. 
 
Policy – implications of noncompliance:  This concept is related to explaining the 
organization’s policy and the consequences for operating information systems contrary to 
said policy. 
 
Unknown e-mail/attachments:  Policy informing users of what actions to take upon 
receiving unknown e-mails or attachments. 
 
Web usage and monitoring of user activity:  Informing users of organization policy 
concerning web usage and informing users of consent to monitor policies. 
 
Spam:  Unwanted e-mail, usually excessive in nature. The problem for organization 
information systems  
 
Data backup/storage:  Provides users information concerning the organization’s data 
backup/storage procedures and policies. 
 
Social engineering:  A term for non-technical or low-technology means – such as lies, 
impersonation, tricks, bribes, blackmail, and threats – used to attack information systems. 
 
Software, supported/allowed on organization systems:  Information relating to users 
the requirements for software on organization systems. This is related to software 
assurance, which is the level of confidence that software is free from vulnerabilities, 
either intentionally designed into the software or accidentally inserted at anytime during 
its lifecycle, and that the software functions in the intended manner. 
 
Access control issues:  Access control is limiting access to information system resources 
only to authorized users, programs, processes, or other systems. 
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Individual accountability: The ability to associate positively the identity of a user with 
the time, method and degree of access to an IS. This is similar to monitoring of user 
activity. 
 
Use of acknowledgement statements:  Policy informing users of situations/systems that 
require user acknowledgement.  
 
Visitor control/physical access to spaces:  Policies controlling visitor access to 
workspaces and information systems. 
 
Desktop security:  Actions users can take to keep their desktops secure, especially when 
visitors/outsiders are in the workplace. 
 
Incident response:  Informing users how to respond, who to contact, specific actions to 
take in the case of an information system incident. An incident is the assessed occurrence 
having actual or potentially adverse effects on an IS.  
 
Shoulder surfing:  The act of watching someone input their password for the purpose of 
capturing the password. 
 
Changes in system environment:  Indicators users should watch for that could signal 
possible breaches in the information system. 
 
Inventory and property transfer:  Description of organization policy. 
 
Personal use/gain issues:  Description of organization policy and consequences of 
misuse. 
 
Handheld device, security issues:  Any special requirements for securing organization 
handheld devices or the policies concerning allowing such devices access to information 
systems. 
 
Use of encryption:  Explanation of encryption, how the organization utilizes it, and user 
responsibilities. 
 
Laptop security:  Any special requirements for securing organization laptops. 
 
Personally owned systems/software at work:  Discussion of policies for allowing 
personal systems/software at work or on organization systems. 
 
Configuration management:  The management of security features and assurances 
through control of changes made to hardware, software, firmware, documentation, test, 
test fixtures, and test documentation throughout the life cycle of an IS. 
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Software license restriction issues:  Informing users on policies for software licensing 
and any applicable restrictions. 
 
Protecting information, confidentiality concerns:  Policies concerned with 
confidentiality, which is the assurance that information is not disclosed to unauthorized 
persons, processes, or devices. 
 
E-mail list etiquette:  Policies defining proper use of e-mail. 
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Section 3 – Code Sheet 
 
 
 
Concept USAF DISA 
Password usage and management      
Malicious code, protection from (includes viruses, Trojans, etc)      
Policy – implications of noncompliance      
Unknown e-mail/attachments      
Web usage and monitoring of user activity      
Spam      
Data backup/storage      
Social engineering      
Software, supported/allowed on organization systems      
Access control issues      
Individual accountability      
Use of acknowledgement statements      
Visitor control/physical access to spaces      
Desktop security      
Incident response      
Shoulder surfing      
Changes in system environment      
Inventory and property transfer      
Personal use/gain issues      
Handheld device, security issues      
Use of encryption      
Laptop security      
Personally owned systems/software at work      
Configuration management      
Software license restriction issues      
Protecting information, confidentiality concerns      
E-mail list etiquette      
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Appendix B. AF Information Protection Module 
 
The following slides were taken from the AF Information Protection module of the Total 
Force Awareness Training. The link for the slides is 
https://golearn.csd.disa.mil/kc/ilc/scorm_course_launch_frm.asp?strCourseID=C02025&strUserI
D=FRUGJ003&strCredit=credit&strMode=normal, but it should be noted the link will not 
work by itself as the system requires a log-in in order to access the training. The training 
may be accessed, with proper credentials, through the AF Portal (https://www.my.af.mil) 
or the Advanced Distributed Learning Service 
(https://golearn.csd.disa.mil/kc/login/login.asp) websites, as provided. 
 
 
 
Slide 3 InfoSec 
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Slide 4 InfoSec 
 
 
Slide 5 InfoSec 
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Slide 6 InfoSec 
 
 
Slide 7 InfoSec 
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